2017 Acura TLX problems

What is wrong

Honda (American Honda Motor Co.) is recalling certain 2013-2023 Honda Accord, Civic Coupe, Civic Sedan, Civic Hatchback, Civic Type R, CR-V, HR-V, Ridgeline, Odyssey, Acura ILX, MDX, MDX Hybrid, RDX, RLX, TLX, 2019-2022 Honda Insight, Passport, 2020 Honda CR-V Hybrid, 2018-2019 Honda Clarity PHEV, Fit, and 2015-2020 Honda Accord Hybrid, Pilot, Acura NSX vehicles. The fuel pump inside the fuel tank may fail.

Risk

Fuel pump failure can cause an engine stall while driving, increasing the risk of a crash.

Remedy

Dealers will replace the fuel pump module, free of charge. Owner letters were mailed September 6, 2024. Owners may contact Honda customer service at 1‑888‑234‑2138. Honda's numbers for this recall are KGC and KGD. This recall is an expansion of the federal safety agency recall numbers 21V‑215 and 20V‑314.

Recall number 23V858000 · Recall details

What is wrong

Honda (American Honda Motor Co.) is recalling certain 2015-2020 Acura TLX, 2016-2020 Acura MDX, 2016 and 2018-2019 Pilot, 2017 and 2019 Ridgeline, and 2018-2019 Odyssey vehicles. Due to a manufacturing error, the connecting rod bearing in the engine may wear and seize, damaging the engine.

Risk

A damaged engine may run improperly or stall while driving, increasing the risk of a fire, crash, or injury.

Remedy

Dealers will inspect and repair, or replace the engine as necessary, free of charge. Owner letters were mailed March 28, 2024. 2016-2017 Acura MDX owner letters were mailed November 1, 2024. 2016-2020 Acura MDX owner letters are expected to be mailed in mid-December 2024. Honda began mailing owner notification letters as of March 18, 2024. 2015-2016 Acura owner letters are expected to be mailed mid-December 2024, 2018 Acura TLX owner letters are expected to be mailed the end of March/early April 2024, 2019 Acura TLX owner letters are expected to be mailed mid-May 2024, 2020 Acura TLX owner letters are expected to be mailed mid-June 2024, and 2016-2020 Acura MDX owner letters are expected to be mailed January 27, 2025. Owners may contact Honda customer service at 1‑888‑234‑2138. Honda's numbers for these recalls are XG1 and GG0.

Recall number 23V751000 · Recall details

What is wrong

Honda (American Honda Motor Co.) is recalling certain 2016-2018 Acura MDX, 2015-2019 Acura TLX and 2015-2017 Honda Accord vehicles, equipped with a 3.5L V6 engine. Particulates in fuel may adhere to the internal components of the fuel pump, reducing its performance.

Risk

Reduced fuel pump performance can result in an engine stall, increasing the risk of crash.

Remedy

Honda will notify owners, and dealers will update the fuel injection engine control unit (FI-ECU) software and, if necessary, replace the fuel pump, free of charge. The recall began March 25, 2019. Owners may contact customer service at 1‑888‑234‑2138. Acura's recall number for this recall is P3W. Honda's recall number for this recall is N3X.

Recall number 19V060000 · Recall details

On June 3, 2022, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation PE22005 after the agency received VOQs and several field reports concerning the Auto Idle Stop (AIS) feature on 2016-2019MY Honda Pilot vehicles. The complaints allege that the engine fails to restart on its own from a complete stop at a traffic light or road intersection with the AIS function engaged. The subject vehicles are equipped with a 3.5L engine with a 9-speed automatic transmission. On January 6, 2023, Honda released service bulletins 23-008 and 23-009. These service bulletins address the failure to restart issue in the 2016-2019MY Honda Pilot vehicles, as well as the 2015-2020 Acura TLX, 2016-2020 Acura MDX, 2019-2022 Honda Passport, and 2020-2023 Honda Ridgeline vehicles. The repair outlined in the service bulletins is a two-stage countermeasure to remedy the issue. The first stage is a Programmed Fuel Injection (“PGM-FI”) software update. The second stage is only deployed if the software update fails to remedy the issue. The second stage, depending on the model and model year, consists of replacement of the starter assembly, starter relays, and a valve adjustment. Additionally, Honda extended the warranty coverage to 10 years with unlimited mileage for vehicles requiring the second stage component replacement. ODI continues to receive complaints of the AIS failure to restart, with many complainants alleging the campaign countermeasures had been completed.the federal safety agency has reviewed Honda's Information Request Letter responses involving warranty claims, lawsuits, and consumer complaints in addition to ODI's own data. This Engineering Analysis is being opened to further consider the potential safety defect, including gathering additional data regarding Honda’s service campaign efficacy. ODI is additionally expanding the scope to encompass all vehicles addressed in Honda’s service bulletins 23-008 and 23-009 as well as newer model year vehicles, which are substantially similar to the vehicles covered by the service campaign. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to

EA25004

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this investigation to determine if the failure of airbags to deploy during severe crashes, in certain vehicles, was the result of a safety related defect. During the investigation a complex failure was studied that can result in non-deployment of subject vehicle air bags and other restraint system devices in severe crash events. The subject vehicles may be equipped with an airbag control unit (ACU) for the supplemental restraint system (SRS) Electronic Control Unit (ECU) manufactured by ZF-TRW.  The ECU receives signals from crash sensors mounted in the vehicle and deploys the vehicle air bags and seat belt pretensioners in accordance with manufacturer design specifications.  The ECU in the subject vehicles contains a model DS84 application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) which controls the communication of the crash sensor signal, firing commands (i.e., when to deploy the airbag(s) and/or pretensioners), and fault information (e.g., diagnostic trouble codes). In September 2016, FCA announced recall 16V‑668 for certain model year (MY) 2010 to 2014 Chrysler, Dodge and Jeep products manufactured with the subject ZF-TRW ACU.  In this recall, FCA discussed an EOS condition that resulted in a failure of the subject DS84 ASIC, which caused air bag non-deployment. FCA noted that the defect condition had only been observed in vehicles equipped with sensor harnessing routed across the front of the vehicle.  Other FCA vehicles that also used the subject ACU, but were not equipped with cross-car harnessing, had not experienced EOS failures, despite similar time in service. During the course of this investigation, ODI sent two separate Information Request (IR) letters to six vehicle manufactures (including FCA, Hyundai, Honda, Kia, Mitsubishi, and Toyota) and one IR letter to ZF-TRW. These IR letters resulted in ODI receiving comprehensive data from these manufacturers and suppliers. Studies of this data found that the DS84 ASIC does not have sufficient protection against negative electrical transients or electrical overstress (“EOS”) that can be generated in certain severe crashes. An electrical transient occurs when the electrical power supplied to a circuit changes momentarily over a short duration of time.  In these severe crash cases, the crash sensors and other powered wiring can be damaged and short circuited so as to create a negative electrical transient of sufficient intensity and duration (that are outside the vehicle manufacturer's specification) to damage the ASIC before the restraint device deployment signal is received by the SRS ECU. This damaged signal can lead to incomplete or nondeployment of the air bags and/or pretensioners.  Airbag non-deployment and/or lack of pretensioner operation can increase the risk or severity of injury in a crash.A total of 8 fatalities and 14 injuries were associated with known EOS events. The common element in all investigated manufacturers vehicles is the SRS ECU containing a DS84 ASIC manufactured by ZF-TRW. The risk associated with the ASIC is equally shared among all OEMS involved in the investigation. The actual real-world risk can be mitigated by other factors which were assessed by ODI during this investigation. The first mitigating factor involves protections built into the ACU design which protect the DS84 ASIC from damage. There are multiple strategies and levels of protection employed by different OEMs that provide effective EOS mitigation. The two most common strategies at the ACU level are circuit protection diodes on the remote senor signal lines, and current limiting resistors that protect critical components. The second mitigating factor is found at the vehicle level and involves the location and routing of the wires leading from the crash sensors to the SRS ECU. If the wires are well protected in a crash and are not routed with other power wires carrying large currents, the risk for an EOS event is significantly reduced or eliminated. These design specific factors combine to produce a spectrum of risk for the vehicles equipped with ACUs using the DS84 ASIC. Given the many of years of field exposure, it is possible to divide the subject population into two groups; vehicles which have experienced EOS events, and vehicles which have not experienced EOS field events. Four of the six OEMs involved in this investigation have experienced EOS field events on at least one of their models equipped with a DS84 ASIC. All vehicle models (including the Toyota models identified in the Failure Report Summary of the opening resume for this investigation) with field events have been recalled. In an abundance of caution, ODI kept this investigation open five years to monitor field performance and did not identify any field events on vehicles not included in existing safety recalls. Given the spectrum of risk identified in this investigation and that all vehicles with a demonstrated unreasonable risk have been recalled, ODI is closing this investigation. ODI is closing this investigation with the following manufacturer safety recalls: 16V‑668, 18E-043, 18V‑137, 18V‑363, and 20V‑024. With the recall actions taken by the subject vehicle and equipment manufacturers, this investigation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by the federal safety agency that a safety-related defect does not exists on other model or model year vehicles outside of the recall scopes. The agency reserves the right to take further action if warranted by the circumstances.

EA19001