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2024 Tesla Model 3 problems

The most common problem on the 2024 Tesla Model 3 is driver assistance and stability. It has fewer complaints than a typical Model 3 model year.

Typical yearClose to a typical year
Owner complaints
224
Recalls
5
Service bulletins
58
Worst area
Driver assistance

The worst 2024 Tesla Model 3 problems

Ranked by number of owner complaints. Mileage and cost come from what owners wrote.

Problems by type

Tap a problem to see which part fails, at what mileage and in which other years.

Specific symptoms reported on the 2024 Tesla Model 3

Adaptive cruise 21Phantom braking 8Lane assist 7Wipers 6

Recalls 5

Air bags: knee bolsterReported July 7, 2026 · 15 vehicles affected
What is wrong
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2026 Model Y and 2024 Model 3 vehicles. The vehicles were originally built for a foreign market and do not have knee air bags, may not be equipped with certain interior safety countermeasures, and may not have been tested for bumper impact resistance procedures. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard numbers, 208, "Occupant Crash Protection," 201, "Occupant Protection in Interior Impact," and Part 581, "Bumper Standards."
Risk
A noncompliant vehicle may have reduced occupant protections, increasing the risk of injury during a crash.
Remedy
Tesla will repurchase noncompliant vehicles currently registered in the United States, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed September 4, 2026. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1‑877‑798‑3752 or [email protected]. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-26-00-004.

Recall number 26V445000 · Recall details

Back over prevention: softwareReported January 6, 2025 · 239,382 vehicles affected
What is wrong
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2024-2025 Model 3, Model S, 2023-2025 Model X, and Model Y vehicles. The computer circuit board may short, resulting in the loss of the rearview camera image. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) number 111, "Rear Visibility."
Risk
A rearview camera that does not display an image reduces the driver's rear view, increasing the risk of a crash.
Remedy
Tesla released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Tesla will also identify any vehicles that experienced a circuit board failure, or stress that may lead to a circuit board failure, and replace the affected computers, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed March 7, 2025. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1‑877‑798‑3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-25-00-001.

Recall number 25V002000 · Recall details

Tires: pressure monitoring and regulating systemsReported December 17, 2024 · 696,281 vehicles affected
What is wrong
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2024 Cybertruck, 2017-2025 Model 3, and 2020-2025 Model Y vehicles. The tire pressure monitoring system (TPMS) warning light may not remain illuminated between drive cycles, failing to warn the driver of low tire pressure. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 138, "Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems."
Risk
Driving with improperly inflated tires increases the risk of a crash.
Remedy
Tesla released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed February 15, 2025. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1‑877‑798‑3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-018.

Recall number 24V935000 · Recall details

Electrical system: softwareReported July 24, 2024 · 1,849,638 vehicles affected
What is wrong
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2021-2024 Model 3, Model S, Model X, and 2020-2024 Model Y vehicles. The hood latch assembly may fail to detect an unlatched hood condition after the hood has been opened.
Risk
An unlatched hood can fully open, obstructing the driver's view and increasing the risk of a crash.
Remedy
Tesla has released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed September 24, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1‑877‑798‑3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-012.

Recall number 24V554000 · Recall details

Air bags: side/window: thoraxReported April 19, 2024 · 1 vehicles affected
What is wrong
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling one 2024 Model 3 vehicle. The driver seat side air bag module was assembled without a deflector that directs gas flow during deployment.
Risk
Without a deflector, the air bag may deploy improperly, increasing the risk of injury during a crash.
Remedy
Tesla service replaced the side air bag, free of charge. The affected vehicle was repaired April 12, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1‑877‑798‑3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-13-001.

Recall number 24V284000 · Recall details

See all 5 recalls for the 2024 Tesla Model 3

Defect investigations

FSD Collisions in Reduced Roadway Visibility ConditionsOpened March 18, 2026, still open

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

EA26002

Traffic safety violations while Full Self Driving ("FSD") is engagedOpened October 7, 2025, still open

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary. The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. the federal safety agency understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. the federal safety agency's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, the federal safety agency’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

PE25012

Compliance with Standing General Order 2021-01 Reporting RequirementsOpened August 20, 2025, still open

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. the federal safety agency is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, the federal safety agency will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1

AQ25002

Actually Smart Summon sessions resulting in low-speed impacts.Opened January 6, 2025, closed April 3, 2026

On January 6, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation 24003 (PE24033) to investigate Actually Smart Summon (Summon) sessions resulting in crashes during active sessions. According to Tesla, Summon is a short-distance SAE Level 2 system, controlled by the user from a cell phone within a certain distance and intended for use in parking lots and on private property. ODI analyzed complaint data provided by Tesla as well as complaints submitted to ODI from consumers to identify Summon incidents resulting in crashes. ODI's analysis indicates that almost all Summon reported crashes involved minor property damage claims with no reported incidents involving a vulnerable road user, injury, fatality, or major property damage as indicated by an air bag deployment or vehicle tow away. Out of millions of Summon sessions, a fraction of 1% resulted in an incident. Almost all those incidents took place where, typically early in a Summon session, the system or person using the app failed to fully detect or respond appropriately to vehicle surroundings resulting in minor impacts. Incidents took place when app users did not have a complete 360-degree view of the surroundings in the app to assess situational awareness. This limited the app user’s ability to determine whether an impact was imminent during initial vehicle maneuvers such as reversing in close proximity to an obstacle or a curb. ODI found that the impacts most often occurred with parking gates, adjacently parked vehicles, and short parking bollards. During this investigation, ODI identified two Summon crashes related to camera blockages. In both crashes, Summon attempted to navigate a snowy parking lot with snow partially or fully obstructing the forward-facing cameras. Summon did not detect the camera blockage and the vehicles collided with unoccupied parked vehicles while navigating the parking lot. App users in both instances did not command a vehicle stop or pause despite the obstructed camera visible in the camera stream in the app. On January 15, 2025, Tesla released Over-the-Air (OTA) Software (SW) Update Action numbers 578998 and 579185 for vehicles in service to implement a camera blockage detection condition. Both OTAs improve camera blockage detection mechanisms. Additionally, on January 20, 2025, and January 30, 2025, Tesla identified additional system requirements associated with camera visibility checks and released OTA SW-578752 and SW-580322, respectively. These firmware updates reduce false negative camera blockage detections due to snow or condensation. In its investigation, ODI identified one Summon incident where the vehicle did not yield for a gate arm blocking a garage exit lane and the app user did not command a vehicle stop or pause, resulting in an impact. On February 6, 2025, Tesla deployed OTA SW-578839 to improve vehicle reaction to dynamic gates. This OTA update upgraded vehicle perception systems through a high-fidelity occupancy determination network, which uses data from vehicle sensory systems to improve reconstruction of field objects with high accuracy. On November 20, 2025, Tesla further improved vehicle performance by adding object detections from a separate neural network through OTA SW-580514. Owners of the affected vehicles received all six OTA SW updates. Tesla also released these SW updates to production vehicles. See online public file for detailed descriptions of all six OTA SW updates. Due to low incident occurrence and low incident severity, this preliminary evaluation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding that a safety-related defect does not exist. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. For additional information regarding this investigation, see the complete online public file.

PE24033

FSD Collisions in Reduced Roadway Visibility ConditionsOpened October 17, 2024, closed March 18, 2026

On October 17, 2024, the federal safety agency’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24031) of Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) to assess: the ability of the FSD system to detect and respond appropriately to reduced roadway visibility conditions; whether any other FSD crashes had occurred under degraded roadway visibility conditions that are similar in nature to the four SGO-reported crashes identified in the opening document, and if so, the contributing circumstances for each of those crashes; and any updates or modifications by Tesla to the FSD system that may affect the performance of FSD in degraded roadway visibility conditions, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of any such updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. During this phase of the investigation, ODI reviewed the materials provided by Tesla detailing any actions taken, or changes, modifications, and updates made that may relate to the alleged defect. ODI reviewed information related to Tesla’s transition to a vision-only perception system, and its deployment of the strategy in vehicles. ODI’s findings include information on limitations of the vision-only perception system and updates made in response to known subject crashes. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. ODI reviewed certain public statements, including those made during an April 2025 earnings call, in which Tesla stated that it had developed a breakthrough “direct photon-counting” capability that eliminates the degradation that the camera-based system experiences when glare is encountered. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI has discussed individual incidents and its initial findings with Tesla. Based on Tesla’s post-incident analysis, the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s FSD system fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants where the camera-based system performance degrades significantly. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the FSD system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired its visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. ODI is upgrading this investigation (PE24031) to Engineering Analysis (EA) 26002 to further evaluate this matter. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

PE24031

Recall 23V838 Remedy EffectivenessOpened April 25, 2024, still open

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary the federal safety agency tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.

RQ24009

Unexpected Brake ActivationOpened February 16, 2022, closed June 29, 2026

On February 16, 2022, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE22002) to investigate reports of unexpected deceleration while driving with the adaptive cruise control system engaged in Model Year (MY) 2021 – 2022 Model 3 and Model Y vehicles manufactured by Tesla. The subject systems include Autopilot (all versions), Full Self-Driving (FSD) and Traffic Aware Cruise Control (TACC). These complaints have been colloquially referred to as “phantom braking”. ODI opened PE22002 to determine the scope and severity of the potential problem and to assess any resulting safety issues in the subject vehicles. The alleged defect is an unexpected and unrequested vehicle deceleration triggered by the subject system during subject system engagement. The alleged defect does not occur when the subject system is not in use and is separate and distinct from Automated Emergency Braking (AEB). During vehicle operation, AEB is actively monitoring in the subject vehicles regardless of subject system and its intervention is accompanied by audible and visual collision warnings. A Vehicle Owners Questionnaire (VOQ) trend originating in November 2021 prompted ODI to open PE22002. VOQ narratives reported unexpected brake activation while using TACC, Autopilot or FSD. The trend grew from 99 by the end of 2021 to 314 by February 16, 2022, when PE22002 was opened. ODI sent Information Request (IR) Letters to Tesla on May 4, 2022, and July 11, 2024, to request salient data to quantify vehicle production, field incidents, and the physical parameters of the phantom braking reports. ODI also requested information pertaining to Tesla’s internal assessments, problem resolutions, and their assessment of the alleged defect. Typically, the complaints to ODI and Tesla allege a 10-20 mph speed reduction at highway speeds over a 1-3 second time period.No collisions were identified. Drivers reported seeing no vehicles ahead in the travel lane that would have triggered the deceleration. Many complaints reported the conditions taking place on higher speed roadways in sunny conditions with shadows on the roadway. Complainants typically applied the accelerator to override the unexpected deceleration, and subject vehicles did not come to a complete stop or steer out of their travel lane. ODI analyzed data provided by Tesla in addition to consumer complaints submitted to ODI. Tesla’s complaint and field data exhibited some behavior that aligned with the transition from a radar-vision fusion system to vision-only in mid-2021. VOQ traffic coincided with public events such as Recall 21V846, the opening of PE22002, and several related media publications. In February and March of 2022, Tesla released firmware updates 2022.4.5.1 and 2022.4.5.17 respectively to target aspects of the subject system programming that affect unexpected deceleration. Incident traffic has dissipated substantially in the past years, with 45 incidents reported in 2024, 19 in 2025, and 3 since the beginning of 2026. The conditions reported, while concerning to the drivers, did not alter the vehicle’s lateral positioning in their lanes and did not cause significant loss in distance between the subject and following vehicle to lead to a collision. Complaint traffic to both the federal safety agency and Tesla reported the same conditions- vehicles traveling with the subject system engaged at higher speeds decelerating suddenly with no commensurate vehicle or obstacle ahead in the same lane. In view of these points, and a low demonstrated hazard to drivers, this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by the federal safety agency that a safety-related defect does not exist. The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to

PE22002

Technical service bulletins for the 2024 Tesla Model 3 58

Bulletins tell dealers how to fix known problems. A warranty extension means the manufacturer pays for that repair for longer.

See all 58 bulletins for the 2024 Tesla Model 3

2024 Tesla Model 3 fuel economy

Official EPA estimates in miles per gallon (MPGe for electric). Ranges cover trims that share the same engine.

EngineDriveCityHighwayCombined
Electric motor Electric 363 mi rangeRWD140-145125-128132-137 MPGe
Electric motor Electric 342 mi rangeAWD117-137107-124112-130 MPGe

What 2024 Tesla Model 3 owners say

Most recent owner complaints, unedited.

Filed Nov 4, 2026 · Steering · WA

The steering wheel cover material (PUR/vegan leather) has separated, cracked, and peeled extensively, primarily at the 3 o’clock and 9 o’clock hand positions. This matches Tesla Service Bulletin SB-23-32-003 regarding steering wheel material separation. The material is delaminating from the underlying structure under normal use. No hand lotion, sanitizer, or other chemicals have ever been applied. Photos available. Vehicle is still under the Basic Vehicle Limited Warranty (4 years/50,000 miles).

Filed Nov 2, 2026 · Electrical · 25,486 miles · FL

The contact owns a 2024 Tesla Model 3. The contact stated that while driving 50 MPH in Full Self Driving Mode, the vehicle cut off another vehicle in the right lane and went over the median and almost crashed. The contact was concerned about glitches in the Full Self Driving Mode which could put the contact and other drivers at risks of injuries or more. The failure mileage was 25,486.

Filed Oct 25, 2026 · Steering, Transmission · FL · crash

Subject: Vehicle Safety Complaint — 2024 Tesla Model 3 RWD — Sudden Loss of Steering Control and Total-Loss Crash I am submitting this complaint concerning a serious safety incident involving my 2024 Tesla Model 3 Rear-Wheel Drive. While driving manually on a wet highway in [XXX], my vehicle suddenly moved sideways and began to lose control. I was not using Autopilot or Full Self-Driving. Despite my attempt to maintain control using the steering wheel, I was unable to steer the vehicle back under control. The vehicle left the roadway and entered a pond, resulting in a total loss. I have video footage documenting the incident and surrounding road conditions. I am concerned that this incident may have involved a vehicle safety defect, potentially involving the steering system, electronic stability control, traction-control system, or another vehicle system responsible for maintaining directional control. I understand that wet-road conditions and hydroplaning are possible explanations; however, I believe the reported inability to regain steering control warrants a thorough technical investigation rather than assuming that weather alone caused the crash. I request that the federal safety agency review this incident for potential safety implications involving the 2024 Tesla Model 3 RWD and determine whether similar complaints or technical findings may indicate a broader safety issue. I also request that Tesla preserve all available vehicle telemetry, diagnostic logs, fault codes, steering-system data, wheel-speed information, and electronic stability-control records associated with the incident. Vehicle information * Make and model: Tesla Model 3 * Model year: 2024 * Drivetrain: Rear-Wheel Drive * Driving mode: Manual * Incident location: [XXX] * Weather: Wet roadway / rain * Outcome: Vehicle left the roadway and entered a pond; total loss * Evidence available: Video footage INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

Filed Oct 20, 2026 · Acceleration, Electrical · FL

On October 16, 2026, my 2024 Tesla Model 3 initiated a standard, factory-prompted over-the-air (OTA) firmware update. During this automated install process, the car's firmware crashed. Following the crash, the vehicle was left unresponsive. Tesla Service conducted a diagnostic review and isolated the problem to a physical failure of the internal hardware: Assembly - Power Conversion System - 48Amp - 1Phase. The vehicle was performing flawlessly and charging efficiently prior to the software update execution. The PCS module did not break due to driver abuse, mechanical wear, environmental damage, or physical aging. It failed strictly because Tesla’s proprietary software update process overtaxed, corrupted, or bricked the internal semiconductor boards during a forced rewrite command. A consumer should not be financially penalized for hardware damage caused by a manufacturer's remote software push.

Filed Oct 9, 2026 · Brakes, Driver assistance · GA

On XXX at approx. 10:30 AM EST, my 2024 Tesla Model 3 was operating on Full Self-Driving (Supervised) on [XXX]. Without warning, the vehicle steered off the paved roadway. The driver attempted to take control by [turning the steering wheel / pressing the brake], but the vehicle did not respond to her input and FSD did not disengage. The car left the road and struck [the curb / roadside edge] before coming to a stop on the grass. Damage: rims cracked and bent, tires deflated and unseated from the rims, grass and soil packed into the wheels, wheel covers torn off, and scrape damage to the fender/wheel arch. The car could not be driven and was towed. Photos attached. Injuries: [none / describe]. Component/system: Full Self-Driving (Supervised) - steering control and driver override. The vehicle is at the Tesla Service Center in [LOCATION] and is available for inspection upon request. I have asked Tesla in writing to preserve all vehicle logs, event data and camera footage, and submitted a data privacy request for the incident data on XXX Safety risk: The driver could not regain control of the vehicle. With oncoming traffic, pedestrians or a deeper roadside hazard, this could have caused serious injury or death. Reproduced/confirmed by dealer: UNKNOWN. Tesla has not provided a diagnosis yet. Inspected by: Tesla Service (in progress). Warning lamps or messages before the failure: [None observed . I believe FSD failed to keep the vehicle on the road and failed to yield control when the driver intervened. I request the federal safety agency review this incident as part of its ongoing FSD investigation. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

Filed Oct 6, 2026 · Electrical · TX · crash

Tesla FSD rear ended vehicle stopped at red light.

Filed Sep 29, 2026 · Driver assistance · NY · crash

My Tesla displays a mandatory FSD (Supervised) disengagement feedback survey on the center touchscreen while the vehicle is in motion. Whenever I disengage FSD and resume manual control, the vehicle automatically asks me to select a reason for the disengagement. On one occasion, after disabling the software due to fsd getting too close the construction, while being flustered,I attempted to disable the prompt and select a random option to get rid of it but kept pressing the wrong area of the screen due to trying to keep paying attention to the road and simultaneously trying to get rid of the prompt, in my frustration to do so,I side swiped one of the big construction cones, it was not a collision and there was no damage but it could have been worse, so I am selecting collision in the questionnaire. Attached as a file is the full complaint, the 2000 char limit is not enough.

Filed Sep 23, 2026 · Visibility · MN

As of an OTA update to the Telsa early this summer, a prompt stating "Why did you intervene" appears over critical display information on the infotainment console. FSD v14.3.2 and onward. (released as part of software update 2026.2.9.9) The prompt appears at the instant you retake manual control. It covers or prevents access to navigation/other driving-relevant controls, like shifting, speed display, mileage, other warning indicators. It remains until you interact with it. The screen demand occurs during a potentially safety-critical transition.

Filed Sep 3, 2026 · Suspension, Wheels · FL

Both front tires on my 2024 tesla model 3 performance developed structural bulges on the inboard sidewall at under 19,000 miles. The tires are the original equipment pirelli p zero 235/35r20 delivered with the vehicle on 12/07/2024. On 08/05/2026 at 18,951 miles, tesla service in doral, florida inspected and road-tested the vehicle for a metallic rubbing noise that increases with speed and also occurs at low speed at full steering lock under acceleration. Tesla's own repair notes on invoice 3000s0017877728 state that the noise was duplicated on the road test and appears to originate from deformed front tires. Tesla took no alignment measurement and the invoice contains no camber, caster or toe readings. The same invoice records tire pressures of 40.2, 39.9, 40.6 and 39.9 psi, so underinflation is not a factor. The failures are symmetric: same axle, same inboard face, both sides, at the same time, which is not consistent with isolated independent road hazard impacts. The bulges are on the inner face and are not visible during a normal walk-around inspection. Tesla states it provides no warranty coverage for tires and declined any vehicle-side diagnosis. A sidewall bulge is a sudden blowout risk, and two of them on the steering axle of a high performance vehicle capable of highway speed is a safety defect concern. Other tesla owners have reported the same inboard sidewall bulge pattern at low mileage on 20-inch wheels, some as early as 7,000 miles. I request that the federal safety agency review whether front suspension geometry or the tire and wheel package on this vehicle contributes to premature inboard sidewall failure. The vehicle remains under its 4-year/50,000-mile basic vehicle limited warranty.

Filed Sep 1, 2026 · Body, Electrical · SC · crash · fire · 1 injury

Client left the road and the vehicle hit a tree by the roadside. The vehicle caught fire and client was incapacitated and unable to operate the door handle from the inside or unlock the doors. Bystanders attempted to open all four doors from the outside, but they were all locked. Bystanders noted that the handles themselves were functional and believe it was an electrical issue keeping the doors locked. Bystanders broke the windows and attempted to open the doors from the inside, but they were unable to access the emergency door release because the driver door panel was on fire in proximity to the emergency release. Bystanders began mechanically disassembling the door to get him out and he was eventually extracted by the fire rescue team. The inability to open the door delayed our client being extricated from the vehicle and as a result he suffered severe injuries, including the loss of both legs, due to severe burns. The vehicle is currently being held by Copart Miami South and is available for inspection. So far, it has been inspected by the insurance company and our experts. Warning lamps, symptoms, etc.: UNKNOWN. Vehicle is badly damaged, so we are not able to recreate/confirm the problem at this time.

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Questions about the 2024 Tesla Model 3

Is the 2024 Tesla Model 3 reliable?

Owners have filed 224 complaints about the 2024 Tesla Model 3, fewer than a typical Model 3 model year.

What is the most common problem with the 2024 Tesla Model 3?

Driver assistance and stability, with 57 complaints. Next is electrical (47).

How many recalls does the 2024 Tesla Model 3 have?

5 recalls, covering air bags, back over prevention and tires.

Was there a recall on the 2024 Tesla Model 3 driver assistance?

Yes, 1 recall: 25V002000. Check your VIN to see if your car still needs the free repair.

What year does the Tesla Model 3 have the most driver assistance problems?

The Tesla Model 3 model years with the most driver assistance complaints are 2022 (559 complaints), 2021 (431 complaints) and 2018 (253 complaints).

What gas mileage does the 2024 Tesla Model 3 get?

The 2024 Tesla Model 3 is rated at 132-137 MPGe combined, with up to 363 miles of range.

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