2013 Toyota Avalon Hybrid problems

What is wrong

Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing (Toyota) is recalling certain 2011-2019 Corolla, 2011-2013 Matrix, 2012-2018 Avalon, and 2013-2018 Avalon Hybrid vehicles. During certain crashes, the air bag electronic control unit (ECU) may malfunction, possibly disabling the deployment of the air bags and/or seat belt pretensioners.

Risk

In the event of a crash, air bags and/or seat belt pretensioners that do not deploy as intended may increase the risk of injury.

Remedy

Toyota will notify owners, and dealers will inspect the ECU and install a noise filter between the air bag control module and its wire harness, as necessary, free of charge. Owners were notified of the safety risk beginning March 2, 2020. A second letter notifying owners of the remedy repair will be mailed between March 16, 2020 and June 27, 2020. Owners may contact Toyota customer service at 1‑888‑270‑9371. Toyota's numbers for this recall are 20TB03, 20TA03 and 20TA05.

Recall number 20V024000 · Recall details

What is wrong

Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing (Toyota) is recalling certain model year 2013-2015 Avalon and Avalon Hybrid vehicles manufactured October 19, 2012 to October 27, 2015 and 2013-2015 Lexus ES350 and ES300h vehicles manufactured June 18, 2012 to July 6, 2015. The affected vehicles are equipped with a Pre-Collision System (PCS) as optional equipment. In these vehicles, the PCS may unexpectedly activate and apply the brakes when the radar detects a steel joint or plate in the roadway as an object.

Risk

A vehicle that unexpectedly brakes increases the risk of a crash.

Remedy

Toyota will notify owners, and dealers will replace certain PCS components, free of charge. The recall began on July 28, 2016. Owners may contact Toyota at 1‑888‑270‑9371. Toyota's numbers for this campaign are F1V and F2E.

Recall number 15V728000 · Recall details

What is wrong

Toyota Motor Engineering & manufacturing North America, Inc. (Toyota) is recalling certain model year 2013-2014 Camry and Camry HV, model year 2013 Avalon and Avalon HV and model year 2014 Corolla vehicles. In the affected vehicles, the windshield wiper switch assembly may short circuit. As such, these vehicles fail to conform to the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, No. 104, "Windshield Wiping and Washing Systems."

Risk

A short circuit could cause inoperative windshield wipers, reducing driver visibility and increasing the risk of a crash.

Remedy

Toyota will notify owners, and dealers will replace the wiper switch assembly, free of charge. The recall began on November 8, 2013. Owners may contact Toyota at 1‑800‑331‑4331.

Recall number 13V505000 · Recall details

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received a petition dated September 19, 2023 from the owner of a 2012 Toyota Prius V requesting that ODI reevaluate its decision to deny DP19-004. In the letter, the petitioner reported experiencing an unexpected and complete loss of brake power while driving, accompanied by multiple dashboard warning lights. This petition is based on the petitioner's direct experience and assessment that ODI closed DP19-004 because its prompting petition was withdrawn by that petitioner. ODI will review the work conducted during DP19-004 and a review of any additional related complaints and crashes via a new defect petition The petition and related materials can be reviewed at under the following ODI number:11553736.

DP23005

the federal safety agency received a petition on or about July 18, 2022, requesting that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 141 be applied to all electric and hybrid vehicles operating in the United States. The petition can be reviewed at under ODI Number 11486072. FMVSS 141 establishes performance requirements for pedestrian alert sounds for motor vehicles. The standard applies to hybrid and electric vehicles that have a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 KG or less or are defined as low-speed vehicles. The standard became fully applicable to all such vehicles manufactured on or after March 1, 2021.On January 27, 2023, the federal safety agency opened Defect Petition (DP) 22-005 to evaluate the subject matter described in the petition. On June 24, 2023 and as supplemented on June 25, 2023, the petitioner notified the federal safety agency he was withdrawing his petition. The petitioner indicated that, based on his review of data, there is no justification for asserting potential benefits that could be derived from actions sought by my petition. Based on the petitioner's withdrawal, DP22-005 is closed. Closure of this DP does not represent a determination by the federal safety agency regarding the subject matter of the petition.

DP22005

On September 19, 2019, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a defect petition from Mr. Roger Hogan requesting that the Agency investigate and recall certain Toyota Prius, Prius PHV, Camry Hybrid and Avalon Hybrid vehicles for a brake actuator valve wear condition covered under Toyota Customer Support Programs ZJB and ZKK (subject CSP?s). In support of his request, the petitioner identified 117 the federal safety agency complaints allegedly related to the subject CSP condition, including 60 reporting crashes. On September 30, 2019, ODI opened Defect Petition DP19-004 to evaluate the petitioner?s request for an investigation. In August 2020, the petitioner notified the Agency that he was withdrawing his petition. Because the petitioner has withdrawn the petition, we are denying the petition as moot and no further analysis of this petition is necessary.the federal safety agency is authorized to issue an order requiring notification and remedy of a defect if the Agency?s investigation shows a defect in the design, construction, or performance of a motor vehicle that presents an unreasonable risk to safety. 49 U.S.C. ?? 30102(a)(9), 30118. Because the petitioner has with withdrawn the petition, the petition is denied as moot. This action does not constitute a finding by the federal safety agency that a safety-related defect does not exist. The Agency notes that it is not required to receive a defect petition prior to opening a defect investigation and will take further action if warranted by future circumstances.

DP19004

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this investigation to determine if the failure of airbags to deploy during severe crashes, in certain vehicles, was the result of a safety related defect. During the investigation a complex failure was studied that can result in non-deployment of subject vehicle air bags and other restraint system devices in severe crash events. The subject vehicles may be equipped with an airbag control unit (ACU) for the supplemental restraint system (SRS) Electronic Control Unit (ECU) manufactured by ZF-TRW.  The ECU receives signals from crash sensors mounted in the vehicle and deploys the vehicle air bags and seat belt pretensioners in accordance with manufacturer design specifications.  The ECU in the subject vehicles contains a model DS84 application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) which controls the communication of the crash sensor signal, firing commands (i.e., when to deploy the airbag(s) and/or pretensioners), and fault information (e.g., diagnostic trouble codes). In September 2016, FCA announced recall 16V‑668 for certain model year (MY) 2010 to 2014 Chrysler, Dodge and Jeep products manufactured with the subject ZF-TRW ACU.  In this recall, FCA discussed an EOS condition that resulted in a failure of the subject DS84 ASIC, which caused air bag non-deployment. FCA noted that the defect condition had only been observed in vehicles equipped with sensor harnessing routed across the front of the vehicle.  Other FCA vehicles that also used the subject ACU, but were not equipped with cross-car harnessing, had not experienced EOS failures, despite similar time in service. During the course of this investigation, ODI sent two separate Information Request (IR) letters to six vehicle manufactures (including FCA, Hyundai, Honda, Kia, Mitsubishi, and Toyota) and one IR letter to ZF-TRW. These IR letters resulted in ODI receiving comprehensive data from these manufacturers and suppliers. Studies of this data found that the DS84 ASIC does not have sufficient protection against negative electrical transients or electrical overstress (“EOS”) that can be generated in certain severe crashes. An electrical transient occurs when the electrical power supplied to a circuit changes momentarily over a short duration of time.  In these severe crash cases, the crash sensors and other powered wiring can be damaged and short circuited so as to create a negative electrical transient of sufficient intensity and duration (that are outside the vehicle manufacturer's specification) to damage the ASIC before the restraint device deployment signal is received by the SRS ECU. This damaged signal can lead to incomplete or nondeployment of the air bags and/or pretensioners.  Airbag non-deployment and/or lack of pretensioner operation can increase the risk or severity of injury in a crash.A total of 8 fatalities and 14 injuries were associated with known EOS events. The common element in all investigated manufacturers vehicles is the SRS ECU containing a DS84 ASIC manufactured by ZF-TRW. The risk associated with the ASIC is equally shared among all OEMS involved in the investigation. The actual real-world risk can be mitigated by other factors which were assessed by ODI during this investigation. The first mitigating factor involves protections built into the ACU design which protect the DS84 ASIC from damage. There are multiple strategies and levels of protection employed by different OEMs that provide effective EOS mitigation. The two most common strategies at the ACU level are circuit protection diodes on the remote senor signal lines, and current limiting resistors that protect critical components. The second mitigating factor is found at the vehicle level and involves the location and routing of the wires leading from the crash sensors to the SRS ECU. If the wires are well protected in a crash and are not routed with other power wires carrying large currents, the risk for an EOS event is significantly reduced or eliminated. These design specific factors combine to produce a spectrum of risk for the vehicles equipped with ACUs using the DS84 ASIC. Given the many of years of field exposure, it is possible to divide the subject population into two groups; vehicles which have experienced EOS events, and vehicles which have not experienced EOS field events. Four of the six OEMs involved in this investigation have experienced EOS field events on at least one of their models equipped with a DS84 ASIC. All vehicle models (including the Toyota models identified in the Failure Report Summary of the opening resume for this investigation) with field events have been recalled. In an abundance of caution, ODI kept this investigation open five years to monitor field performance and did not identify any field events on vehicles not included in existing safety recalls. Given the spectrum of risk identified in this investigation and that all vehicles with a demonstrated unreasonable risk have been recalled, ODI is closing this investigation. ODI is closing this investigation with the following manufacturer safety recalls: 16V‑668, 18E-043, 18V‑137, 18V‑363, and 20V‑024. With the recall actions taken by the subject vehicle and equipment manufacturers, this investigation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by the federal safety agency that a safety-related defect does not exists on other model or model year vehicles outside of the recall scopes. The agency reserves the right to take further action if warranted by the circumstances.

EA19001