The driver side, rear passenger seat buckle, and the middle rear seat buckle, due to work/latch. Tesla is refusing to repair under warranty and charging $160 per seat buckle.
The worst 2024 Tesla Model Y problems
Ranked by number of owner complaints. Mileage and cost come from what owners wrote.
Problems by type
Tap a problem to see which part fails, at what mileage and in which other years.
- Driver assistance177
- Electrical63
- Acceleration37
- Brakes27
- Steering24
- Body17
- Lights13
- Suspension12
- Visibility10
- Airbags9
- Wheels9
- Engine8
- Seat belts7
- Transmission7
- Fuel system5
- Locks4
- Seats4
- Tires2
Specific symptoms reported on the 2024 Tesla Model Y
Adaptive cruise 59Backup camera 44Lane assist 33Collision warning 26Headlights 25Wipers 20Sudden acceleration 15No deployment 10Battery drain 8Screen failure 5Phantom braking 5
Recalls 5
Back over prevention: software
- What is wrong
- Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2024-2025 Model 3, Model S, 2023-2025 Model X, and Model Y vehicles. The computer circuit board may short, resulting in the loss of the rearview camera image. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) number 111, "Rear Visibility."
- Risk
- A rearview camera that does not display an image reduces the driver's rear view, increasing the risk of a crash.
- Remedy
- Tesla released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Tesla will also identify any vehicles that experienced a circuit board failure, or stress that may lead to a circuit board failure, and replace the affected computers, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed March 7, 2025. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1‑877‑798‑3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-25-00-001.
Recall number 25V002000 · Recall details
Tires: pressure monitoring and regulating systems
- What is wrong
- Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2024 Cybertruck, 2017-2025 Model 3, and 2020-2025 Model Y vehicles. The tire pressure monitoring system (TPMS) warning light may not remain illuminated between drive cycles, failing to warn the driver of low tire pressure. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 138, "Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems."
- Risk
- Driving with improperly inflated tires increases the risk of a crash.
- Remedy
- Tesla released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed February 15, 2025. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1‑877‑798‑3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-018.
Recall number 24V935000 · Recall details
Seats: front assembly: recliner
- What is wrong
- Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2024 Model Y vehicles. The weld attaching the seat recliner mechanism to the front seat backs may fail.
- Risk
- The seat back frame may not properly restrain the occupant during a crash, increasing the risk of injury.
- Remedy
- Tesla service will replace the seat assembly, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed January 21, 2025. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1‑877‑798‑3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-13-004.
Recall number 24V886000 · Recall details
Electrical system: software
- What is wrong
- Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2021-2024 Model 3, Model S, Model X, and 2020-2024 Model Y vehicles. The hood latch assembly may fail to detect an unlatched hood condition after the hood has been opened.
- Risk
- An unlatched hood can fully open, obstructing the driver's view and increasing the risk of a crash.
- Remedy
- Tesla has released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed September 24, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1‑877‑798‑3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-012.
Recall number 24V554000 · Recall details
Electrical system: instrument cluster/panel
- What is wrong
- Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2012-2023 Model S, 2016-2024 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, 2019-2024 Model Y, and 2024 Cybertruck vehicles. An incorrect font size is displayed on the instrument panel for the Brake, Park, and Antilock Brake System (ABS) warning lights. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 105, "Hydraulic and Electric Brake Systems" and 135, "Light Vehicle Brake Systems."
- Risk
- Warning lights with a smaller font size can make critical safety information on the instrument panel difficult to read, increasing the risk of a crash.
- Remedy
- Tesla began releasing an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1‑877‑798‑3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-003.
Recall number 24V051000 · Recall details
See all 5 recalls for the 2024 Tesla Model Y
Defect investigations
FSD Collisions in Reduced Roadway Visibility Conditions
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
EA26002
Traffic safety violations while Full Self Driving ("FSD") is engaged
The Office of Defects Investigation (âODIâ) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traï¬c safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary. The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traï¬c laws. ODIâs investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driverâs supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identiï¬ed a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traï¬c safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The ï¬rst type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traï¬c signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traï¬c. With respect to the ï¬rst type of scenario, ODI has identiï¬ed 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traï¬c signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traï¬c signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traï¬c signal. ODI has identiï¬ed six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traï¬c signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. the federal safety agency understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identiï¬ed 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identiï¬ed 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODIâs review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. the federal safety agency's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, the federal safety agencyâs investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.
PE25012
Compliance with Standing General Order 2021-01 Reporting Requirements
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. the federal safety agency is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, the federal safety agency will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1
AQ25002
Actually Smart Summon sessions resulting in low-speed impacts.
On January 6, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation 24003 (PE24033) to investigate Actually Smart Summon (Summon) sessions resulting in crashes during active sessions. According to Tesla, Summon is a short-distance SAE Level 2 system, controlled by the user from a cell phone within a certain distance and intended for use in parking lots and on private property. ODI analyzed complaint data provided by Tesla as well as complaints submitted to ODI from consumers to identify Summon incidents resulting in crashes. ODI's analysis indicates that almost all Summon reported crashes involved minor property damage claims with no reported incidents involving a vulnerable road user, injury, fatality, or major property damage as indicated by an air bag deployment or vehicle tow away. Out of millions of Summon sessions, a fraction of 1% resulted in an incident. Almost all those incidents took place where, typically early in a Summon session, the system or person using the app failed to fully detect or respond appropriately to vehicle surroundings resulting in minor impacts. Incidents took place when app users did not have a complete 360-degree view of the surroundings in the app to assess situational awareness. This limited the app user’s ability to determine whether an impact was imminent during initial vehicle maneuvers such as reversing in close proximity to an obstacle or a curb. ODI found that the impacts most often occurred with parking gates, adjacently parked vehicles, and short parking bollards. During this investigation, ODI identified two Summon crashes related to camera blockages. In both crashes, Summon attempted to navigate a snowy parking lot with snow partially or fully obstructing the forward-facing cameras. Summon did not detect the camera blockage and the vehicles collided with unoccupied parked vehicles while navigating the parking lot. App users in both instances did not command a vehicle stop or pause despite the obstructed camera visible in the camera stream in the app. On January 15, 2025, Tesla released Over-the-Air (OTA) Software (SW) Update Action numbers 578998 and 579185 for vehicles in service to implement a camera blockage detection condition. Both OTAs improve camera blockage detection mechanisms. Additionally, on January 20, 2025, and January 30, 2025, Tesla identified additional system requirements associated with camera visibility checks and released OTA SW-578752 and SW-580322, respectively. These firmware updates reduce false negative camera blockage detections due to snow or condensation. In its investigation, ODI identified one Summon incident where the vehicle did not yield for a gate arm blocking a garage exit lane and the app user did not command a vehicle stop or pause, resulting in an impact. On February 6, 2025, Tesla deployed OTA SW-578839 to improve vehicle reaction to dynamic gates. This OTA update upgraded vehicle perception systems through a high-fidelity occupancy determination network, which uses data from vehicle sensory systems to improve reconstruction of field objects with high accuracy. On November 20, 2025, Tesla further improved vehicle performance by adding object detections from a separate neural network through OTA SW-580514. Owners of the affected vehicles received all six OTA SW updates. Tesla also released these SW updates to production vehicles. See online public file for detailed descriptions of all six OTA SW updates. Due to low incident occurrence and low incident severity, this preliminary evaluation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding that a safety-related defect does not exist. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. For additional information regarding this investigation, see the complete online public file.
PE24033
FSD Collisions in Reduced Roadway Visibility Conditions
On October 17, 2024, the federal safety agency’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24031) of Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) to assess: the ability of the FSD system to detect and respond appropriately to reduced roadway visibility conditions; whether any other FSD crashes had occurred under degraded roadway visibility conditions that are similar in nature to the four SGO-reported crashes identified in the opening document, and if so, the contributing circumstances for each of those crashes; and any updates or modifications by Tesla to the FSD system that may affect the performance of FSD in degraded roadway visibility conditions, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of any such updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. During this phase of the investigation, ODI reviewed the materials provided by Tesla detailing any actions taken, or changes, modifications, and updates made that may relate to the alleged defect. ODI reviewed information related to Tesla’s transition to a vision-only perception system, and its deployment of the strategy in vehicles. ODI’s findings include information on limitations of the vision-only perception system and updates made in response to known subject crashes. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. ODI reviewed certain public statements, including those made during an April 2025 earnings call, in which Tesla stated that it had developed a breakthrough “direct photon-counting” capability that eliminates the degradation that the camera-based system experiences when glare is encountered. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI has discussed individual incidents and its initial findings with Tesla. Based on Tesla’s post-incident analysis, the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s FSD system fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants where the camera-based system performance degrades significantly. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the FSD system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired its visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. ODI is upgrading this investigation (PE24031) to Engineering Analysis (EA) 26002 to further evaluate this matter. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
PE24031
Recall 23V838 Remedy Effectiveness
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary the federal safety agency tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.
RQ24009
Unexpected Brake Activation
On February 16, 2022, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE22002) to investigate reports of unexpected deceleration while driving with the adaptive cruise control system engaged in Model Year (MY) 2021 – 2022 Model 3 and Model Y vehicles manufactured by Tesla. The subject systems include Autopilot (all versions), Full Self-Driving (FSD) and Traffic Aware Cruise Control (TACC). These complaints have been colloquially referred to as “phantom braking”. ODI opened PE22002 to determine the scope and severity of the potential problem and to assess any resulting safety issues in the subject vehicles. The alleged defect is an unexpected and unrequested vehicle deceleration triggered by the subject system during subject system engagement. The alleged defect does not occur when the subject system is not in use and is separate and distinct from Automated Emergency Braking (AEB). During vehicle operation, AEB is actively monitoring in the subject vehicles regardless of subject system and its intervention is accompanied by audible and visual collision warnings. A Vehicle Owners Questionnaire (VOQ) trend originating in November 2021 prompted ODI to open PE22002. VOQ narratives reported unexpected brake activation while using TACC, Autopilot or FSD. The trend grew from 99 by the end of 2021 to 314 by February 16, 2022, when PE22002 was opened. ODI sent Information Request (IR) Letters to Tesla on May 4, 2022, and July 11, 2024, to request salient data to quantify vehicle production, field incidents, and the physical parameters of the phantom braking reports. ODI also requested information pertaining to Tesla’s internal assessments, problem resolutions, and their assessment of the alleged defect. Typically, the complaints to ODI and Tesla allege a 10-20 mph speed reduction at highway speeds over a 1-3 second time period.No collisions were identified. Drivers reported seeing no vehicles ahead in the travel lane that would have triggered the deceleration. Many complaints reported the conditions taking place on higher speed roadways in sunny conditions with shadows on the roadway. Complainants typically applied the accelerator to override the unexpected deceleration, and subject vehicles did not come to a complete stop or steer out of their travel lane. ODI analyzed data provided by Tesla in addition to consumer complaints submitted to ODI. Tesla’s complaint and field data exhibited some behavior that aligned with the transition from a radar-vision fusion system to vision-only in mid-2021. VOQ traffic coincided with public events such as Recall 21V846, the opening of PE22002, and several related media publications. In February and March of 2022, Tesla released firmware updates 2022.4.5.1 and 2022.4.5.17 respectively to target aspects of the subject system programming that affect unexpected deceleration. Incident traffic has dissipated substantially in the past years, with 45 incidents reported in 2024, 19 in 2025, and 3 since the beginning of 2026. The conditions reported, while concerning to the drivers, did not alter the vehicle’s lateral positioning in their lanes and did not cause significant loss in distance between the subject and following vehicle to lead to a collision. Complaint traffic to both the federal safety agency and Tesla reported the same conditions- vehicles traveling with the subject system engaged at higher speeds decelerating suddenly with no commensurate vehicle or obstacle ahead in the same lane. In view of these points, and a low demonstrated hazard to drivers, this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by the federal safety agency that a safety-related defect does not exist. The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to
PE22002
Technical service bulletins for the 2024 Tesla Model Y 58
Bulletins tell dealers how to fix known problems. A warranty extension means the manufacturer pays for that repair for longer.
- On some Model Y vehicles built before February 28, 2026, the design of the HVAC inlet duct may lead to...
- On some Model Y vehicles, the rear view mirror upper camera cover is not sufficiently transparent, which...
- A firmware diagnosis feature is being introduced on Model 3 and Model Y vehicles that monitors wheel...
- Certain Model 3 and Model Y vehicles were manufactured with High Voltage (HV) batteries containing cell...
- On some Model Y vehicles, the center high mounted stop light may
- On certain Model Y vehicles, the LH and/or RH rear primary body seals might
- Tesla does not provide physical owner's manual copies
- On certain Model 3 and Model Y vehicles, a defective electrical component inside the High Voltage...
- Some Model Y vehicles running a vehicle software version earlier than 2024.20.3 require a vehicle software...
2024 Tesla Model Y fuel economy
Official EPA estimates in miles per gallon (MPGe for electric). Ranges cover trims that share the same engine.
| Engine | Drive | City | Highway | Combined |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Electric motor Electric 320 mi range | RWD | 128 | 112 | 120 MPGe |
| Electric motor Electric 310 mi range | AWD | 111-123 | 98-112 | 105-118 MPGe |
What 2024 Tesla Model Y owners say
Most recent owner complaints, unedited.
While driving with the vehicle's Full Self-Driving system engaged, my vehicle suddenly displayed a 'Rear Motor Disabled' alert and lost all propulsion, without any prior warning of any kind. The vehicle could not be restarted. I had just exited State Route 134 onto a local road across from Providence High School in Burbank, California, and the vehicle came to a stop in the middle of the roadway, in darkness. Had this failure occurred minutes earlier, while traveling at highway speed at night, the consequences could have been catastrophic: a vehicle that suddenly loses all propulsion and cannot be restarted becomes a stationary obstacle in fast-moving traffic, in darkness, with no ability to move to the shoulder. Drivers approaching from behind at highway speed would have little time to react, and a rear-end collision — or a multi-vehicle chain collision — would be a likely outcome, with a high risk of serious injury or death. No crash or injury occurred in this incident, but only because of where the failure happened, not because the failure itself was benign. The vehicle's alert screen displayed fault codes DI_a139 (Rear motor disabled) and DIR_a126 and DIR_a062 (Propulsive power reduced). Tesla Service Center has agreed to repair the vehicle under warranty (drive-unit warranty), but no diagnosis has been provided yet. Even once repaired, I have no assurance the underlying cause has been identified or that it will not happen again. The incident occurred at approximately 8:30 PM.
Following a software update (2026.38.3.2), without any prior warning messages or symptoms, the vehicle's onboard computer failed on 10/26/26, which resulted in the loss of critical driver-assistance and safety systems. The affected systems included the backup and side-view cameras, blind-spot monitoring, emergency braking, collision warning, lane departure warning/assistance, rear cross-traffic alert, GPS, and adaptive headlights. The loss of the cameras and blind-spot monitoring reduced my ability to identify surrounding vehicles and pedestrians, while the loss of automatic emergency braking, collision warnings, and lane-assistance features eliminated important safety functions designed to help prevent accidents. The problem was confirmed by a Tesla Service Center. According to Tesla's diagnostic findings: "In this instance, your vehicle's computer consists of both a primary and a secondary component. Our diagnostic findings indicate that both parts failed, not due to an internal short, but because of a complete loss of communication between the primary and secondary units." Tesla inspected the vehicle and determined that the computer required complete replacement. The vehicle is currently at the Tesla Service Center awaiting repair and will be unavailable for inspection. A previous recall (25V‑002) addressed a similar computer failure and relied on a software update as a remedy, however the recurrence of a related failure raises concerns about whether that remedy was sufficient. I am concerned that the automatic software update on 10/26/26 may have contributed to the failure of the car computer. The fact that the failure occurred after the update, without any prior warning, and resulted in the loss of multiple critical safety systems presents a serious safety concern. A software update should not leave a vehicle without essential safety equipment or render multiple driver-assistance systems inoperable.
I am reporting a potentially serious rear suspension safety defect involving a 2024 Tesla Model Y manufactured in January 2024. On August 22, 2026, during tire service, technicians demonstrated excessive movement of the right-rear wheel while applying torque. I observed the entire wheel visibly shifting relative to the wheel opening and recorded the movement on video. I postponed a prepaid wheel alignment and scheduled a Tesla inspection. Tesla subsequently confirmed excessive play in the right-rear upper ball joint and replaced it. During this repair, Tesla discovered that the retaining nut was missing from the right-rear upper fore-link-to-subframe connection and that the corresponding subframe mounting hole was elongated. A missing suspension retaining nut and elongated mounting hole could compromise the structural integrity of the rear suspension, potentially causing instability or suspension separation while driving. The vehicle sustained a rear-end collision on May 29, 2026, but remained drivable without observable suspension symptoms immediately afterward. The cause of the subsequently discovered damage remains undetermined. Tesla denied coverage for the subframe. Tesla’s service documentation shows that the rear upper fore-link tightening specification increased from 76 Nm to 84 Nm on October 25, 2023, before this vehicle was manufactured. I request investigation into whether inadequate fastener retention, loss of clamping force, or an assembly or design defect could contribute to this failure. The vehicle remains unrepaired at a Tesla-certified collision facility in Massachusetts, with the damaged subframe available for inspection. I request that the federal safety agency investigate this potential safety defect, examine similar complaints, and consider inspecting the vehicle before the damaged components are removed or discarded. Photographs, video, technician findings, and repair estimates are available upon request.
I have been rear-ended three times within the past 9 months while using FSD on my 2024 Tesla Model Y. First while obeying a yield sign, second, stopping abruptly for a vehicle making a right turn on red, and yesterday hit by another vehicle backing out of a parking lot space. No personal injuries were involved in any of these situations. My out of pocket costs for the first 2 incidents has totalled about $3,500. I dont yet have the estimate for the latest incident or the likelihood and extent of insurance coverage. Up until using FSD, I had not been involved in any collision for at least 25 years.
Safety Critical Bug: While driving on surface streets, FSD indicated (via initiating a right turn signal) it was going to make a right turn into a parking lot that was not specified on its current navigation path. I disengaged FSD. After disengaging FSD, the turn signal software remained in an active right-turn state. Physical turn signal stalk inputs (both light taps and full pushes in either direction) failed to override or cancel the signal. Vehicle continued signaling a right turn, and the signal could not be manually cancelled. Only after about a minute of driving straight, did the signal self-cancel.
The rear camber adjustment continues to move out of spec on my 2024 Tesla Model Y which causes excessive wear on the inside of the rear tires. My last alignment was completed on June 23 , 2026 with new tires by Tesla and the tires have already started showing severe wear on the inside of the rear tires. When this first happened in July 2025, the tires wore on the inside so much that my tire went flat while I was over 130 miles away from home at [XXX] in the morning on [XXX], the conditions were very unsafe. This problem has been re-produced several times and has cost me over 3500 dollars in tires and fees. There were no symptoms prior to the incidents because the tires looked great from the outside. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
While my Tesla was backing out of my driveway under Full Self-Driving, I saw people approaching and took over manual control. Immediately after I disengaged FSD, a touchscreen survey asking “Why did you intervene?” appeared and covered their representation in the high-fidelity proximity visualization. At the moment I took control because people were approaching, the survey obscured information about those people that I needed to monitor while maneuvering. My primary complaint is that a feedback request blocks safety-relevant proximity information immediately after the driver takes over, including while the vehicle is still moving. The survey also blocks media controls and other content on the left side of the screen. Regaining access requires dealing with the survey, creating an additional reason to look away from the road during the transition to manual driving. I am asking the federal safety agency to investigate this interface design. Tesla should keep the proximity visualization and controls unobstructed and defer the feedback survey until the vehicle is parked.
While preparing to make a left turn on a yellow turn signal with FSD (Supervised) engaged, an oncoming vehicle in the opposite lane approached at high speed. FSD apparently failed to detect it in time; the car hesitated and paused directly in the path of the oncoming vehicle. I had to press the accelerator to avoid a serious collision. FSD's judgment at complex intersections with fast oncoming traffic appears inadequate. Street name unknown.
I was slowing for a red light - I was nearly stopped a safe distance behind the car in front of me, then my Tesla applied automatic emergency braking. There was absolutely no danger or imminent accident. I was not injured, but my dog was thrown forward and hit the dashboard. This happened again when I went to accelerate as the light turned green - I got up to about 5 mph and automatic emergency braking was applied again, this time nearly causing the car behind me to rear-end me (and it generated a few honks as the Tesla wouldn't let me drive through the green light). This is the latest incident - AEB has been triggered two other times in the past year, both times worse than this, but I didn't have video and didn't know where to report it. This has been reported to Tesla, no response (yet). The vehicle/component has not be inpsected by anyone. No warning lamps were on prior to the failure. (note - i do have video of the incident, but i doesn't let me upload mp4)
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Questions about the 2024 Tesla Model Y
Is the 2024 Tesla Model Y reliable?
Owners have filed 338 complaints about the 2024 Tesla Model Y, fewer than a typical Model Y model year.
What is the most common problem with the 2024 Tesla Model Y?
Driver assistance and stability, with 177 complaints. Next is electrical (63).
How many recalls does the 2024 Tesla Model Y have?
5 recalls, covering back over prevention, tires and seats.
Was there a recall on the 2024 Tesla Model Y driver assistance?
Yes, 1 recall: 25V002000. Check your VIN to see if your car still needs the free repair.
What year does the Tesla Model Y have the most driver assistance problems?
The Tesla Model Y model years with the most driver assistance complaints are 2021 (628 complaints), 2023 (549 complaints) and 2022 (531 complaints).
What gas mileage does the 2024 Tesla Model Y get?
The 2024 Tesla Model Y is rated at 120 MPGe combined, with up to 320 miles of range.
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